Employer intent is not prerequisite for discrimination.
New discrimination ruling in Maine under equal pay law
Takeaway: Employers can expect courts to be uniformly unsympathetic to the argument that a plaintiff alleging sex-based pay disparity must prove an intent to discriminate in the face of a state’s equal pay law’s unambiguous statutory language to the contrary. The consensus view of state and federal courts in the U.S. is that discriminatory intent is not a required element of viable wage discrimination claims.
Under Maine’s equal pay law, a plaintiff alleging sex-based pay disparity dose not need to prove intent to discriminate where the acknowledged pay disparity for comparable work was not due to an established seniority system, merit pay system or shift differences.
The 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals awarded more than $180,000 to the plaintiff, a female licensed clinical psychologist, against her former nonprofit hospital employer.
The sex discrimination action against her former employer noted that two male colleagues in a “pool” of five psychologists were paid nearly twice as much as the plaintiff and their other two female colleagues. She brought the pay disparity to the attention of management. Around this time, the hospital independently became aware of several sex pay disparities among hospital employees and initiated an attempt to standardize pay across sexes.
The parties agree that all the pool psychologists possessed the same fundamental qualifications including doctoral degrees and licenses to practice psychology in Maine as well as comparable experience and skills in providing psychological services. The hospital conceded that it did not pay its psychologists differently pursuant to any seniority system, difference in shift or time of day worked, or merit increase system. Instead, it says that a “market-based compensation structure” explained any pay disparity.
The female psychologist alleged that the hospital violated the Maine Equal Pay Law (MEPL) by paying male and female employees different wages for comparable work, that its failure to provide equal pay amounted to sex discrimination in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that it committed unlawful retaliation in firing her. She asked for partial summary judgment only on her MEPL claim, asserting that the undisputed facts established the hospital’s liability under Maine’s equal pay statute. The hospital argued that the statute required a showing of intent to discriminate or alternatively that it should be permitted to raise the affirmative defense that it relied on a reasonable factor other than sex to set these wages.
The district court held the MEPL does not impose an intent requirement on a plaintiff, nor does it permit a defendant to rely on a catch-all affirmative defense, because it explicitly limits affirmative defenses to pay differentials based on seniority, merit, or differences in shift or time of day worked. Further, those who violate the MEPL may be liable for treble damages.
Employer’s Intent to Discriminate Is Not Required Element Under Maine Equal Pay Law (shrm.org)
Commentary by: Raylea Stelmach
Edited by: Kim Moss
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